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European Influence upon the Making of
The American Constitution.
I.
Introduction.
If one studies the making of the constitution of the United
States, he finds that many influences have left their imprint upon
that document. In it can be found traces of the influence of the
colonial governments, of the government under the Confederation,
and of European influences. A careful study of the formation of
the constitution reveals the fact that commerce between the
United States and Europe played an important role in the making
of this document. Indeed, the meeting at Annapolis which led to
the convention of 1787 was called to consider the trade and com-
mercial systems of the United States. A contemporary writer, speak-
ing of the commissioners to the Annapolis convention, said they
"were appointed by various states to propose a general plan of
commerce, and to give to congress the powers necessary to exe-
cute. The debt Wi:ich the United States owed to European coun-
tries likewise had its effeot on the formation of the constitution.
Repeatedly in the source material of this period is found a direct
reference to the condition of the credit of the United States. Ab
early as July 21,1782, the New York legislature passed resolutions
1. Hart "Contemporaries", III, 185.
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"for a General Convention of the States," which read, "Notwith-
standing the generous intentions of an ally from whom we have
experienced and doubtless shall still experience all possible
support, exigencies may arise to prevent our receiving pecuniary
2
succors hereafter in any degree proportioned to our necessities,"
Governor Randolph in the federal convention when the two plans of
3
gover ;ment were being discussed, declared, "When our all is at
stake, I will consent to any mode that will preserve us. View
our deplorable situation- France, to whom we are indebted in every
motive of gratitude and honor, is left unpaid the large sums she
4has supplied as with in the day of our necessity." Then, too,
the United States wished to be well thought of in Europe and there
is little doubt that public opinion in foreign countries stimulated
the desire for a stronger government. Europe at this time was wait
ing to see the power of the new nation, and the leaders of the
United States felt that in order to command the respect of Europe,
a firm government must be instituted. Jay, writing during the
period of ratification, said, "But whatever may be our situation,
whether firmly united under one national government or split into a
number of confederacies, certain it is that foreign nations will
know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us
5
accordingly." In yet another way Europe made itself felt in the
confctitutional convention and during the period of ratification.
2. ' 'Hamilton) "Works",' I, 297.
3. Federal or confederate.
4. Farrand, "Records", I, 262.
5. "Federalist", No. 4.

It afforded patterns of government, some of which were deliberately
copied and others as diligently avoided. It is this phase of
European influence with which this paper has to deal. It will en-
deavor to point out just how far consciously the makers of the con-
stitution followed or avoided the models afforded by the govern-
ments of Europe.
In treating this subject, it seems best to divide it into five
topios: preparation of members; European influence on the form and
strength of government; European influence upon the provisions for
the legislature; European influence upon the executive; and
European influence upon the judiciary.
II.
Preparation of the Members of the Federal Convention.
Let us consider first, then, how well prepared the members of
the constitutional convention were for performing the stupendous
task which confronted them, the making of a new form of government.
The convention was originally called for the purpose of revising the
Articles of Conf edsration, but it made a new constitution instead.
Gathered at Philadelphia in this convention were forty-eight of
the most learned and renowned men of the country. Statesmen,
lawyers, business men, and farmers were present. Of this number the
majority were lawyers, twenty-six in all. Eight of these took a
prominent part in the debates of the convention and later figured
in the conventions of their own states which were called for the
purpose of ratifying the constitution. These were William Davie,
from North Carolina; John Diokinson, from Delaware; Oliver Ellsworth
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from Connecticut; William Livingston, from New Jersey; Gouverneur
Morris, from Pennsylvania; Charles Pinokney, from South Carolina;
Edmund Randolph, from Virginia; and John Rutledge, from South
Carolina. James Madison, of Virginia, should also be included in
this list because, while he did not practice law, he had prepared
himself for that profession and his legal knowledge was quite broad.
William Richardson Davie was born in England1 , but his parents
came to this country while he was yet a young boy, so that his
actual life in England had little effect on his later political
dootrines. After graduating from Princeton, he was admitted to
practice law in the county courts of North Carolina and in 1780
3
seoured his superior court license. Sparks says of Davie, "His
studies had rendered him familiar with the theory and practical
workings of different systems of government, and he was in no
degree deficient in the discernment and forecast, which enable one
4
to seize the merits and anticipate the results of a new scheme."
At the age of eighteen, John Dickinson began the study of
5
law in Philadelphia under a lawyer who had studied in the Temple.
Here Dickinson became familiar with the English law and seemed to
be especially interested in Coke, one of the great English lawyers.
A biographer of Dickinson says, "He then laid.... the foundation
of that knowledge of the common law and especially of that great
familiarity with English history, and English constitutional law...
gby flhich he was distinguished above all his contemporaries."
1. Sparks, "Library of American Biography", XV, 3.
3. " " " " " XV, 11.
3. " * n n n XV, 13.
4. " " " " " XV, 86.
5. Stille, "Life and Times of John Dickinson", 19.
6. Stille, "Life and Times of John Dickinson", 30.
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Later, Dickinson studied law in the Temple itself. Stille sums
up Diokinson's usefulness thus, "He was certainly one of the most
useful and conspicuous members of that illustrious body which
framed the Constitution of the United States. .. .and an examination
of the records of the Convention will show how vastly important
were his acquaintance with the general principle of English free
institutions and his long experience and profound knowledge of
affairs in settling the foundations of our great system of consti-
Q
tutional law. In yet another way, Dickinson exerted his influence
during this period. While the constitution was being ratified,
phamplets and short publications of all sorts flooded the country.
Among these were some letters signed "Fabius, " which were written
by Dickinson. These were in favor of the constitution and in them
is displayed the author's knowledge of European and especially
English government.®
Less information is to be had regarding the education of
William Livingston. He graduated from Yale in 1741 and immediate-
ly began studying with a New York lawyer. In the records of the
federal convention and in those of hie own state convention we find
Dickinson alluding again and again to European history and law in
such a manner as only a serious student of those subjects could.
Edmund Randolph also was among the more briliant members of
the convention. After his graduation from college he studied law
7. The Temple Inns were law schools in London in which the English
law and constitution were s-udied. Anyone practicing law in
England had to study in one of these inns of law, the Inner
Temple, the Middle Temple, or the Outer Temple.
8. Stille, "Life and Times of John Dickinson", 258.
9. Usually published with the "Federalist."
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with bis father, who was quite prominent. Hs served in the con-
tinental congress and during his term from 17S0 to 1783 he had
charge of foreign correspondence.^ Conway says of him, "No
American more thoroughly knew the principle of English law and
13
liberty." ~* Randolph also definitely prepared for the work of 1767.
Conway writes that as early as 1783 Randolph had been trying to find
the fundamentals of a constitution, feeling that the Articles of
Confederation would soon have to be changed. He finds in a note
of Randolph's of March 7,1783, a constitution defined as "a compact
in which the people themselves are sole parties, and which they
alone can abrogate; delineating the degree to which they have
parted with legislative, executive and judiciary powers, as well
as prescribing how far each of the simple forms of government is to
13be pursued in acts of legislation." March 37,1787, Randolph
wrote to Madison, "I have turned my mind somewhat to the business
14
of May next." The results of Randolph's studies are to be found
15
in the plan of government which he submitted to the convention.
In its original form it was much like what the English government
would be today without a monarch and with the second chamber of the
legislature chosen by the House of Commons.
As has been said before, James Madison, while he did not
practice law, was well educated and trained for that profession.
In 1772 he graduated from Princeton College and on returning to his
10. Conway, "Omitted Chapters in History, Disclosed in the Life
and Papers of Edeiund Randolph," 14.
11. ibid, 43.
12. ibid, 88.
13. ibid, 72.
14. Ibid. 71. Madison replied that he too had been thinking of the
work in nana.
15. The Virginia plan.
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home continued his preparation for admission to the bar. But he
went into public life instead. Madison also very diligently pre-
pared for the work of the conventions. At this time his good friend,
Jefferson, was in France and Madison wrote to him for books. March
16, 1784, he wrote, "I will only particularize my wish of whatever
may throw light on the general constitution and droit public of
the several confederacies which have existed. I observe in
Boinaud's catalogue several pieces on the Dutch, the German, and
the Helvetic, The operation of our own must render all such lights
of consequence. H Then he asked Jefferson to get tracts of
Bynker shoek"1,0 and other European 'writers. Some of theieevidently
arrived for Madison thanked his friend for them in a letter dated
18
August 20. Again on April 27, 1735, he wrote to Jefferson for
oertain books. He wanted "treatises on the anoient or modern
foederal republics- on the law of Nations - and the history natural
and political of the New World; to which I will aid such of the
Greek and Roman authors where they can be got very cheap, as are
worth having, the translation (Frenoh) of the Historians of
the Roman Empire during its decline .Pascal 's Provincial
19 30
letters - Don Ullva in the Original - Linnaeus best edition
16. A German writer on political science.
17. Madison, "Works", II, 43.
18. ibid, II, 64.
19. A French religious philosopher and mathematician. These letters
are valuable mostly from the literary standpoint.
20. It is impossible to determine with this meager bit of informa-
tion exactly what writer toas meant. The "Dictionary of
Political Science," III, 596, gives a Spanish writer by this
name as the author of "Restableoimiento de las Fabricas y
Comeroio Espand, " published 1740. The "Grand Dlctionnaire
Universelle" by Larouse, 640, gives two other Spanish his-
torians by this name, Antonio de and Martin de. But a3 the
former died in 1580 and the latter n°* until 1800, it is
probable that Martin de Ullva is meant.
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21
Ordinances Marines - Collection of Tracts in French on the
Oeconomics of different nations, I forget the full title. It is
32
much referred to by Smith on the 'Wealth of Nations. 1 " His
letters also show that he was not only reading, but was in addition
attempting to work out a plan of government. In a letter dated
August 23,1785, he outlined some salient points which he thought
a good government should possess. Speaking of the judiciary, he
wrote, "Its efficacy is demonstrated in Great Britain where it
maintains private Right against all the corruptions of the other
two departments and gives a reputation to the whole Government
33
which it is not in itself entitled to." He wanted a court of
chancery as distinct from the court of law and cited Lord Bacon as
23
his authority." Again in a letter to Randolph, dated April 8,
1787, Madison showed that he was strongly influenced by the English
gover.iment. In this letter he expressed his desire that the
national government should have a negative on the state laws sim-
34
iliar to that which the king of England had on local laws. But
more significant even than his letters wa3 a small memorandum which
Madison had, "of Ancient and Modern Confederacies written on small
sheets of paper, whioh, put together formed a compact little book,
suited to be carried in the pocket." There were thirty-nine pages
of this and it contained notes and criticisms on the Lycian Con-
federacy, Grys.n League, Amphyctionie Confederacy, Achaean Con-
federacy, Helvetic Confederacy, Belgio Confederacy and the Germanic
31. The "British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books" gives no one witt
this name except a Swedish botanist and no writing of this
sort is listed among his works.
22. Madison "Works", II, 134.
23. Ibid, II, 170
24. Ibid, II, 338.
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Confederacy. The raemorandura analyzes theae various governments and
25
notes their good and bad points. The supposition is that
Madison kept these with him for referenoe during the constitutional
convention.
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut spent the first two years of
Off
his college life at Yale and the remaining ones at Princeton. His
father wished him to become a minister and he studied accordingly.
3ut he became more and more interested in law and finally devoted
2'
all hie time to it, being admitted to the Connecticut bar in 1771.
A biographer says of Ellsworth at Princeton, "The acquaintances
Ellsworth made there and the outlook he gained, were doubtless a
better introduction to the whole field of colonial politics than
28
he could have got at any other college." Brown likewise thinks
that the legal education which Ellsworth received after leaving
college was of little depth. He lists Bacon's, "Abridgements",
Jacob's "Law Dictionary" and probably Blackstone's "Commentaries"
as the texts which Ellsworth studied. Ellsworth's legal train-
ing is summed up thus: "It is altogether improbable that Ellsworth
possessed, at the outset of his professional career, any such
store of facts or principles as would now be required of him in an
examination for admission to the bar of any ITew England state. Yet
the way he did learn the law was not unlike the method of studying
^5. Madison, "Works", II, 369-390.
36. Brown "Life of Oliver Ellsworth", 13-18,
37. ibid, 31.
38. Brown "Life of Oliver Ellsworth", 30.
39. ibid, 32 and 23.
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and teaching it wnich has come of late into a very wide acceptance.
He mastered it only by searching out and storing in his mind the
principles at the heart of particular cases. In that process is in-
volved the essence of the modern case-system. It is doubtful if a
39
better training for the reason has ever been devised." By the
time of the constitutional convention, Ellsworth had become a
supreme judge in the state of Connecticut^ and the debates show
that in spite of his meager education in law when he began his
profession, by 1787 his knowledge in this field was both broad and
deep.
The material about Pinckney, Rutledge, and Gouverneur Morris
is less abundant and while they may have been as well prepared as
the ones just discussed, yet we have no direct evidence of such
preparation. We find in the records of the convention all of these
men taking part and infer from their speeches a knowledge of
European governments. But in this group, it is only of Gouverneur
Morris that we have much evidence of preparation for the tasks of
the convention. The others were renowned lawyers, Pinokney having
been educated in England and read law at the Temple. Gouverneur
Morris graduated from King*e College in 1768 and began studying
33law with a man who later became chief justice of New York. Morris
was licensed to practice law three months before he was twenty
, 33
years old.
39. Brown "Life of Oliver Ellsworth", 33
30. ibid, 119.
31. Curtis, "History of the Constitution of the United States, I,
369-390
33. Morris, "Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris," I, 1-18.
33. Curtis, "History of the Constitution of the United States"
I, 463.
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34
Three other members were born abroad. These were James McHenry
IK
Robert Morris 43 and James Wilson. Of these, Wilson only had much
influence in the convention along the line with which this paper
deals. Wilson was born in Scotland about 1742, He received a fine
education, studying at Glasgow, St. Andrews, and Edinburgh. He
came to America in 1766 and was soon elected to the faculty of
36
Philadelphia College. He studied law and was admitted to the bar.
No other member of the convention shows more familiarity with
European government and history than does Wilson. And in the
Pennsylvania convention for ratification, he again and asain alludes
to European precedent. During the debates in this convention, he
said, "I have endeavored, in all the books that I have access to,
to acquire some information relative to the Lycian Republic, but
its history is not to be found." He also quotes in the same speech
from Montesquieu and Necker, showing that he is familiar not only
37
with European history and government, but with writers as well.
Two other members of the convention should be included in this
discussion. These are Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin.
Hamilton was educated at King's College and at the age of seventeen
wrote an essay on "Rights of the Colonies," in which he displayed
3 8
a rather unusual knowledge of English constitution, Curtis says
34. McHenry was born in Ireland and received a classical education
at the University of Dublin. His attendance at the conven-
tion of 1787 was evidently a small part in his career and he
did not figure in the debates of that body. Brown, "Sketch of
the Life of Dr. James McHenry," 2.
35. Morris was born in Liverpool and brought to America Wiile he
was yet a young boy. He was more interested in commerce than
in politics as such. Graham, "Robert Morris", 1,
36. Curtis, "History of the Constitution of the U.S.", I, 462
37. Elliot, "Debates, n II, 483.
36. Curtis, "History of the Constitution of the U.S.", I, 410
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of him, "He understood America as thoroughly as the wisest of his
contemporaries, and he comprehended England more completely than
39
any other man of that age upon this continent."
Benjamin Franklin was rather uniquely prepared for the work of
the Convention from having been abroad, both in England and in
40
France. He was a resident agent in England for some of the colonies
for several years before the revolution. While in England he saw
the workings of the English government at close range, occupying
a seat in the House of Commons. During his ministry in France,
1776-1785, he gained a knowledge of the French government. That
Franklin was well read in politics is shown by the fact that
European writers consulted him on this subject. A foreign writer
wrote to Franklin, sending him copies of his work on "Science of
Legislation. 11 The author said, "The volumes contain the fourth
book of the work, which has for its subjects the laws which concern
education, manners, and public instruction. My ideas on this sub-
ject are certainly new, but are they sound? A*s to this point, it
41belongs to you more than anyone else to decide." A man so re-
cognized should be well suited for the task of the Philadelphia
convention.
It has been pointed out above that certain European writers
on politics, government, and economics has been read rather ex-
tensively by certain men. Other writers had also been read by the
members of the federal convention and were again and again referred
to as authority on various subjects. French writers were most
39. Curtis, "History* of the Constitution of the U.S.", I, 410.
40. Ga., N.J.j Mass. and Penn.
41. Franklin, "Works", X, 237.
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often quoted, and of these the great Montesquieu most frequently.
Colbert and Necker, two French economists of the time of Louis XVI,
were also frequently mentioned, especially by those greatly in-
terested in economics, such as Hamilton. English writers were
likewise often referred to. Blackstone, one of the greatest
lawyers, was most often quoted. At first it may seem strange that
Locke was not often mentioned. But on seoond thought it does not
seem remarkable because he was concerned more with the fundamental
foundations of society than with government itself. Mention was
also made of a writer named Priestly. By this must have been meant
Priestley, an English philosopher and writer. Sidney and Harrington
were the remaining two English writers mentioned. These were
publicists of the seventheenth century. Scotland also furnished
one writer on government, Rutherford, who lived from 1791 to 1854.
Two Swiss writers on law and government were referred to, Vattel,
1714-1767; and Burlamagui, 1694-1748. Only one ancient writer was
found mentioned, Plutarch. His work mentioned was his, "Life of
Themistacles. » In general, then, we may say that modern writers
were referred to in connection with the making of the constitution
more often than ancient ones; and that of these, Frenoh, English,
and Swiss writers were quoted most often as authorities.
III.
European Influence upon the Form and
Strength of Government.
Naturally, from men well read in history and government would
be expected many allusions to those fields. One of the questions
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most discussed was, what the form of government should be. The two
forme most ardently advocated were federal and confederate. Those
who wished a federal government wanted the national government
supreme over the states. Those desiring a confederate government
1
wished to keep the states supreme over the national government.
Both ancient and modern governments were used as precedents. The
ancient countries more often pointed to mere Greece and Rome. In
the correspondence before the convention the history of Greece,
especially the Amphyctionic and Achaean leagues, waB discussed
as something wnich was to be avoided in America. Hamilton as
early as 1780 in hie letters Bhowed a desire for a strong govern-
ment. He spoke of Grecian republics as being always at war be-
2 3
cause they were not united. Again in the "Continentallst"
Hamilton urged a strong government. In the first, speaking of the
commonwealths of Greece, he said that a weak executive and "the
want of a solid federal union to restrain the ambition and rival-
ship of the different cities, after a rapid succession of bloody
wars, ended in their total los& of liberty, and subjugation to
4
foreign powers." In the second of these essays he made still
more emphatic this idea that the stronger member of a confederate
union will overturn the government and he again cited the
Amphyctionic league. In the third of the series he asked, "Is it
1. A f ew men leaned toward monarchy. Hamilton was one of the^e.
2. Hamilton, "Works", I, 307.
3. Lodge considers the "Continental! st" as the series of essays
which began the movement for a constitutional convention.
4. Hamilton, "Works", I, 235.
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not to be feared that the resolutions of Congrebs would soon be-
5
come like the desisions of the Greek Amphictions?"
Likewise, in the federal convention, the Amphyctionic and
Achaean leagues were referred to as something to be avoided on ac-
count of their weakness. A few examples will show this. Hamilton
on June 13th showed that a confederation was weak and would lead
to war. He pointed to the Amphyctionic council as an example and
said that while it seemed to have powers sufficient for itself, yet
when it attempted to use force against a member it was a signal for
war, as was shown by the Phocian War.** July 7, Gouverneur Morris
declared that local jurisdiction when oarried to the extreme of a
confederation would destroy every tie among the members and he
cited the Grecian states for an illustration. In answer to the
advocates of the New Jersey play, Madison asked if that plan would
insure against foreign influence over the members of the confedera-
tion. He specified "intrigues practiced among the Amphyctionic
Confederates first by the Kings of Persia and afterwards fatally by
Phillip of Macedon: Among the Achaeans, first by Macedon and after
-
g
wards no less fatally by Rome." Hamilton on June 18, showed
another weakness of confederacies when he brought out the fact that
in the Amphyctionic league when quotas were to be raised, the decrees
of the council were disregarded, Yates in his notes for this day
recorded, "The Amphyctionic council of Greece "had a right to re-
quire of its members troops, money and the force of the country.
5. Hamilton, "Works", I, 553.
6. Farrand, "Records", I, 385.
7. ibid, 553.
8. ibid, 319.
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Were they obeyed in the exercise of these powers? Could they pre-
serve the peace of the greater states and the republics? or where
were they obeyed? History shows that their decrees were disre-
garded, and that the stronger states, regardless of their power,
9
gave law to the lesser."
Again, during the period of ratification the Grecian leagues
fere referred to both in the state conventions and in publications,
in the light of forms of government to be avoided. In the New York
convention was mentioned the feebleness of the Araphyctionic league
and the fact that it had no power to enforoe its decision.
^
Randolph in the Virginia convention declared that the Amphyctionic
council owed its downfall to confederate government and Madison
showed that the continual dissensions in the Achaean league were
due to the confederate form of government Of the various
phair.plete and letters which were written at this time, the
12
"Federalist"* is best preserved for us and in it also are found
warnings against such a form of government as that of the
Amphyctionic and Achaean leagues. In the fourth number, Jay pointed
to the failures of the states of Greece, saying, "It is not im-
probably that what has so often happened would, under similar cir-
cumstances, happen again." In number eighteen, Hamilton gave a
rather detailed account of the downfall of the Grecian Confederacy
9. Farrand, "Records", I, 296.
10. Elliot, "Debates," II, 234.
11. ibid, III, 130. The examples are typical of all the state
conventions
.
12. A publication written by Ma-ieon, Hamilton, and Jay with the
purpose of winning opponents to the constitution.
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associated under the Ainphyotionic council and also of the downfall
of the Achaean League. His point was that the weaknesses of these
two governments was that they were confederacies and to this he
attributed the cause of their downfall, "Had Greece," ho wrote,
"been uuited by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her
union, she would never have worn the chains of Maoedon; and might
have proved barriers to the vast project of Rome." But he added,
"There was definitely more of moderation and justice in the ad-
ministration of its J^chaean League] government and less of violence
and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the
cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sovereignty;
because it was there tempered by the general authority of the con-
federation." Then he declared that a still stronger union would
make for more efficiency in government. To sum up the influence
which Gr-ccoe exerted on the form and strength of the government pro-
vided for in the constitution, we may say that those responsible for
the calling of the convention, the members of the convention, and
the ones who worked most strenuously for the ratification of the
constitution saw in the Amphyctionio and Achaean leagues dangerous
examples which were to be diligently avoided.
The remaining ancient government referred to can be disposed
of in a few sentences. These include Sparta, Rome, Carthage and
Persia. The opponents of the federalistic idea urged that several
republics would be better on this continent than one and that the
bonds of commerce would hold them together and prevent wars. In
the sixth number of the "Federalist" hamilton showed from history
that this is not true. He pointed out that Sparta, Athens, Rome
and Carthage were republics and were very war-like. He also cited
<J
-18-
Venioe as a later example of this. Other enemies of the federal
plan held that it would be impossible to have a strong federal
government with state as subdivisions and friendly to the superior
government. Wilson in the federal convention on June 16 showed
from history that governments usually do have subdivisions and
pointed to Persia and Rome as examples. There was harmony in those
countries amon~ the central government and the various state
13
governments, he declared. Rome was again referred to when Hamilton
brought out the idea that if a weak government were established,
the occasion might arise whereby it would be necessary to swing
to the other extreme. He said, "Establish a weak government and
you must at times overlap the bounds. Rome was obliged to create
14
dictators.
"
Modern countries likewise furnished ideas of government to
the numbers of this assembly at Philadelphia. Of these we find
Poland, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, and Great Britain most
referred to. 15 The division of Poland in 1772 was often referred
to as the fate of countries which have weak governments. In that
year Poland had lost large sections of her territory to Russia,
Prussia, and Austria. The more recent historians as well as the
earlier writers attribute her downfall largely to a week internal
government. Lord says of Poland's downfall, "It seems clear, how-
ever, that the decline of Poland is to be traced primarily to po-
13. Farrand, "Records", I, 322.
14. ibid, 329.
15. Sweden was referred to once. In the twenty-second number of
the "Federalist", Hamilton showed from history that there
had been a great deal of corruption in confederacies. He
said that in Sweden parties were bought and sold alternate-
ly by England and France.
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litical causes, to the defects of a wretched system of government.
Whatever other cause of weakness one may discover, these are
all of but secondary importance. These evils, or equally grave
ones, could be met with ir; other European states of the old regime,
and yet no other great state atoned for them by the loss of its
existence. For everywhere else there was a government strong
enough to curb or diminish the destructive tendencies and to pro-
duoe or assist invigorating ones. Poland alone had no such cor-
recting or ameliorating force, Rland had no effective government
whatever. The nation lived in an anarchy thinly concealed under
the forms of an elaborate republican constitution. It is in the
unfortunate historic evolution of that constitution that the ex-
16
planation of the decline of Poland is to be sought." By the
time of the constitutional convention, Poland had begun to reor-
ganize her government but was making little head-way because her
central government was not strong. In fact, it could scarcely be
called a central government because each of the large Polish nobles
was practically a petty king. A good example of the light in
which Poland was regarded was made in the nineteenth number of
the "Federalist," in which Madison and Hamilton pointed out the
weaknesses of modern confederacies and Poland was given as an ex-
ample. They wrote, "Equally unfit for self -government and self-
defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbors
to disourden it of one-third of its people and territory."
Germany also in general was held to have a government the
likeness of ff ich was not desired in the United States. In the
second number of the "Coat inentalist, " Hamilton in pointing out
16. Lord "The Second Partition of Poland", 7.
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that a federal government would be overturned by the stronger
17
government gave the German Diet as an example. Referring to it
again in number three, he asked, "Is it not to be feared that the
resolution of Congress would soon become ....like the edicts of
the German Diet."18 In the convention also we find references
repeatedly to the German Confederation. For example, on July 7th
Gouverneur Morris declared that unless we united, our country would
be in the same disunited conditions as Germany had been because
people would think it more important to support local governments
IS
than the central one as they did in the Empire. He declared that
local jurisdictions would destroy every tie of unity. Madison,
June 9, stated that the larger states of a confederacy would be
impregnable and the smaller states would feel the vengeance of the
20larger ones. He irew illustrations from the German Empire. Again
on June 19th Madison in answer to Patterson, who wished a confederate
form of government, traced an anology between the Germanic Con-
federation and the conditions that would prevail in the United
States if that form of government were continued. He held that in
Germany it had been the tendency of particular members to usurp
powers and bring confusion and ruin on all and the same would be
31
expected in America.' In the period of ratification also this
country was cited as weak. A typical statement is found in the
nineteenth number of the "Federalist". In this Madison and
17. Hamilton, "Works", I, 240. The Diet had no power to enforce its
decrees.
16. ibid, 343.
IS. Farrand, "Records", I, 553.
30. ibid, 320.
21, ibid, 317.
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Hamilton cited failures of modern oonf ederacies. They used Germany
for their first illustration and pointed out its weaknesses. They
showed that it had been subject to every kind of internal war. The
fundamental prinoiple on whioh it rests, that the empire is a com-
munity of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns,
renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its
own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with
increasing fermentation in its own bowels."
But in one way Germany furnished a favorable argument
for those advocating the constitution. One of the arguments used
against it was that the United States was too large a country for
a united nation and that it should be split into several smaller
ones. At various times European nations were shown to be approxi-
mately equal in size to the United States and Germany was one used
as an illustration. For instance, in the thirteenth number of the
"Federalist" Hamilton refuted this argument by declaring that the
United States is not a great deal larger than Germany, in which a
representative diet met. 22
Switzerland likewise served as an example mainly for
the advocates of the new form of government. It was cited as an
argument against a confederacy because of its weakness. For in-
stance, in the nineteenth publication of the "Federalist," Hamilton
and Madison in pointing out that history showed confederacies to
be weak, wrote that the separation of Switzerland into cantons
"produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the
22. He also said that the country was little larger than Poland
before its dismemberment and also that in England the
northern representatives, i.e., from Scotland, have as far
to travel as any in the United States would have.
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head of the Protestant association, with the united Provinces;
and of Luzerne at the head of the Catholic association with France."
This, they insinuated, would be the case in any country with a
decentralized confederate government,- the various parts would have
different foreign interests and relations. In the Philadelphia
meeting on June 19, Madison asked if the New Jersey plan would
prevent foreign influenoe over the various members of the league.
He said that in Switzerland there had been a great deal of foreign
23
corruption by Austria, France and the lesser neighbors. The Swiss
confederacy was also used to show the internal condition of a
country with this kind of government. Hamilton in the federal con-
vention on June 18 pointed out that the Swiss cantons had scarcely
34
any union and were always at war with each other. But on the other
hand, it is interesting to note that the opponents of the federal
system also found justification for their position in the Swiss
confederacy. In the first place, the advocates of the New Jersey
plan saw it as a model. They held that here was a state in which
the Various parts, the cantons, had equal representation regardless
of population. For example, Berne and Lucerne had different popu-
34
lations, yet each had an equal voice in the general assembly.
Then, too, the very fact that Switzerland had existed for a long
time with this form of government had weight with certain people.
Henry declared in the Virginia convention for ratification that
a confederacy would stand; the Stfiss confederacy had stood for 400
years and we would do well to establish a government which would
33. Farrand, "Records," I, 319.
34. ibid, 385.
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25last as long. Switzerland was to the federalists a weak govern-
ment and an example in a negative fashion; to the anti -federalists
it was a country of long standing, because of this its form of
36government was to be copied.
Similarly, Holland was cited for much the same purpose as was
Switzerland, except that only the friends of the constitution used
it as an illustration of their points. The Statholder was at the
head of the Dutch confederacy. In 1787 Frederick William II sent
an army into Holland against certain parties whioh were oppressing
the friends of the Statholder who were adherents of England. At
this time Austria was in need of an ally to help her carry out
certain designs on the Ea3t. In order to get the support of
England, Frederick William II sent thi3 array into Holland. Such
was Holland's situation at the time of the convention and different
men pointed to it as an argument against a confederacy like the
Dutch. In the twentieth number of the "Federalist" is one of the
clearest statements of this argument. In this essay Hamilton and
Madison showed that this war was due to the confederate form of
government. They said that the characteristics of the confederacy
were "imbecilily in government; discord among the provinces; foreign
influence and indignities, a precarious existence in peace, and
peculiar calamities from war the important truth which it
[experience] uniquivocally pronounces in the present case [Holland]
is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over govern-
ments, a legislature for communities as contradistinguished from
25. Elliot, "Debates", III, 63.
26. ibid.
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individuals, as it Is a soleoism in theory ao in practice it is
subversive of order and ends of civil polity, by substituting vio-
lence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in
place of the mild and solutary coercion of the magistracy." Again
and again great stress was laid on the fact that Holland, as a
confederacy, had had repeatedly unsuccessful wars. In the
Massachusetts convention, Rufua King in upholding the federal form
of government declared that the lack of efficiency was what caused
2 7
Holland such distress in the forty years of war with Spain. The
internal weakness of Holland was also used as an argument against
confederacies. For example, in the Connecticut convention the
Dutch republic was referred to as having no force; this weakness
38
caused internal dissensions and finally force had to be used. In
the field of revenue also Holland furnished an example, Hamilton
in the fourth number of the "Continentalist " showed that revenues
under the old system would not be sufficient. Referring to Holland
he wrote, "Taxes in the United Provinces are practicable here. Not
only the living are made to pay for every necessary of life, but
even the dead are tributary to the public for the liberty of inter-
ment at particular hours. » He further argued that if such was the
case in Holland, still worse conditions could be expected in the
United States under similar government because it was eo much
2°
poorer. w An argument was also drawn from Holland to refute those
advanced by men who wished to see the country divided into several
independent states. It was argued that small states, such as these
27'. 'Eiiioti ' "Debates") "ll, *55.'
'
28. ibid, "Debates", II, 188. The Statholder is meant.
29. Hamilton, "Works", I, 251.

would necessarily be, would find it harder to defend and protect
themselves. Oliver Ellsworth in the opening debate of the
30
Connecticut convention declared thi3 to be the case in Holland.
To Holland, then, few men looked for precedent to be followed be-
cause of its unfortunate war with Austria. Lack of sufficient
revenue in Holland and internal dissensions wore urged as further
evidence that a confederate government would fail.
In spite of the fact that the revolution was yet prominent
in the minds of the people, still influential men in America real-
ized that the English government was strong and firm. This much
they desired to oopy although most of the people wished to avoid
the semblence even of a monarchy. But the strength of the British
government was desired only by those who wished a federal form of
government. Dickinson in the federal convention on June 7 said
the variety of interests of the various parts of the country need
not be a barrier to the establishment of a firm central government.
Yates' notes on this speech are, "The objection (to the constitu-
tion) is that you attempt to unite distinct interests- I do not
consider this an objection, Safety may flow from this variety of
interests. There exists this diversity in the constitution of
31 \ 1Great Britain." In connection with Great Britain was brought
forward repeatedly the fact that both England and Scotland were
better off after than before their union. For example, Randolph
in the Virginia convention used this as an illustration in favor
33
of a stronger union. Jay in the fourth publication of the
30. Elliot, ' "Debates'S " XX, '137,'
31. Farrand, "Records", I, 159.
32. Elliot, "Debates," III, 75.
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"Federali6 t" pointed to Great Britain as a mighty nation and then
he proceeded to ask what would it be if the militias and navies of
Great Britain, Scotland, and Wales were each under a separate govern-
ment, inferring that the same result might be expected in a dis-
united America. In the following number Jay dibcussed more fully
the good points of the British union. He quoted from a letter of
Queen Anne's of July 1,1706 to the Scotch parliament on the import-
ance to both countries of a union. He showed that until the parts
of the island were united, there was continuous and perpetual war-
fare. This, he said, would be the case if the United States were
33divided. It is interesting to note, however, that in this same
connection certain men thought the English government weak, and
that was an argument against the proposed constitution. For in-
stance, Patrick Henry declared in the Virginia convention that the
English government was not strong, but weak; and that if it had been
strong and concentrated, the American revolution could not have
34
succeeded. At another time in the convention Henry said that it
33. One can detect in this same essay an interesting trace of an
attempt to intimidate the southern states when the writer
added that in the past, northern countries had been stronger
than southern ones, and that would probably be the case if
the United States were separated. He further suggested that
there would be alliances of these stronger states as in
Europe. He wrote, "Nay it is far more probable that in
America, as in Europe, neighboring nations acting under
the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions
would frequently be found taking different sides. 3>
34. Elliot, "Debates", III, 173.
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was from our British ancestors that we had drawn our liberty and
that a federal government whic;h would be very different from
35
British ideals would tend to destroy that liberty. So then, the
British government furnished an example both for the friends and
the enemies of the' constitution. Its advocates saw in this docu-
ment a semblence of the strong centralized government of Great
Britain, a thing which they desired. On the other hand, the op-
ponents of the constitution saw in the British governmant one which
was decentralized. This they admired and since they thought the
constitution did not provide for this, they opposed it.
In addition to European governments the writings of various
publicists on political science, finance, and economics were con-
sulted on problems connected with the establishment of a government.
Montesquieu as in favor of a weak central government. That writer
had said that wnen "you give titles of nobility, you know what you
give; but when you give power, you know not what you give." Henry
thought that too much power had been given to the'cantral govern-
ment provided in the new constitution.^ But it is interesting to
note that in the same convention Montesquieu Looke, Sidney,
Harrington, and other writers wer~ referred to as wanting a strong
37government. Again a member of the New York convention "begged
leave to remind the gentleman that Montesquieu, with all the example
of modern and ancient republics in view, gives it as hie opinion
that a confederated republio has all the internal advantages of a
republic, with the external force of a monarchy." 38 The following
statements were made in the Massachusetts convention, "It may not,
35. Elliot, "Debates",' ill,' *54.
36. ibid, 165.
37. ibid, 294
36. ibid, II, 224.

therefore, be improper to examine whether the federal constitution
proposed has a likeness to the different state oo net i tut ions
for Baron Montesquieu observes, that all governments ought to be
relative zo their particular principles, and that 'a conf ederative
.government ought to be composed of states of the same nature, es-
pecially of the republican kind. 1 " This was an argument for the
constitution in as much as it did measure up to that standard.
Other writers were also mentioned. On June 37 Luther
Martin "contended at great length and with great eagerness that
the General Government was meL.nt merely to preserve the States
Governments: not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to
be kept within narrow limits;.... that individuals as such have
little to do but with their own states.... In order to prove that
individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent
he read passages from Locke. Vattel, Lord Summers-Priestly. To
prove that the case is the same with States till they surrender the
equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke and Vattel, and
40
also Rutherford," Two typical instances will show that the ad-
vocates of the new system found precedents in European economists.
Hamilton in the fourth number of the "Continentalist " urged that a
strong government should be established and have control of com-
merce. He pointed to the work of Colbert and Louis XIV as an ex-
ample to be followed. In the federal convention on June 18
Hamilton declared that the progress of the public mind against
democracy "led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as
himself would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Meeker on the
39. Elliot, "Debates", II, 136.
40. Farrand, "Records", I, 388.
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Britich constitution, namely, that it is the only government in
the world 'which unites public strength with individual security,'"
IV.
European Influence upon the Legislative System.
The constitution of the United States provides for a bi-
oameral legislature. In the main this feature of the new govern-
ment was copied directly from the various states of the union. But
some reference is made to European countries in this connection.
Pinckney approved of the two branches because of the checks this
system would provide. In some observations on the constitution sub-
mitted to the Philadelphia convention, May 28, 1787, he pointed out
that such was the British System.^" Those who desired a one-
chambered legislature showed that the confederacies of history had
had only one branch. The advocates of the bi-cameral system replied
that it was because they had known no better. On June 30 in the
federal convention Wilson "urged the necessity of two branches;
observed that if a proper xodel was not to be found in other con-
federacies it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was
1. Farrand, "Records", III, 110. It is interesting to note that
when the question of the composition of the house was taken
up Pinckney made a long speeoh comparing the constitution of
the United States with European countries. He showed that
while England had the best constitution in the world, it
was very different from the United States because it had
three estates and the United States did not. Hence, he did
not consider it necessary to have a hereditary king and an
upper house in the United States merely because they were
found in England. Farrand, "Records", I, 397-404. It
often nappened that the men who opposed a certain measure
in the federal convention supported that same measure in
the constitution while it was being ratified.
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(email) and the duration of some at least short. The Amphyotionic
and Achaean were formed in the infancy of political Science; and
appear by their History and fate, to have contained radical defects.
The Swiss & Belgic confederacies were held together not by any
vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of formi-
dable neighboring nations: The German owed its continuance to the
influence of the H. of Austria." The only other reference of
significance was found in the sixty-third number of the "Federalist.*
In this it was urged that Athens would have gained much if she had
had a more deliberative and cool body. Tnis it was expected the
Senate would do for the U.iited States. This essay also pointed out
that all long-lived republics had senates. Sparta, Rome,and
Carthage were given as examples. In general, then, certain European
governments furnished an example of a bi-cameral system and others
were cited as examples which would have been improved by a second
branch. But the references to European precedent for a bi-cameral
legislature are few and rather insignificant.
The provisions in the constitution for equal representation
in the senate and proportional in the house were not adopted without
a great deal of argument and eventually a compromise between those
who wanted equal representation and those who desired representation
according to population. Those who wanted equal representation for
the states argued in the first place that unless this were granted
to tnerc, the small states would be swallowed by the larger ones.
The union between England and Scotland was repeatedly referred to,
to show that this was not necessary. A typical quotation may be
2. Farrand, "Records", I, 343.
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taken from a paper which Franklin presented to the federal conven-
tion on June 11. It read, "I recollect that in the beginning of the
century, irhen the union was proposed of the two kingdoms, England
& Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of fears, that unless
they had an equal number of Representatives in Parliament, they
should be ruined by the superiority of the Engliah. They finally
agreed, however, that the different proportions of importance in
the union of the two nations should be attended to, whereby they
were to have only forty members in the House of Commons, and only
sixteen in the House of Lords. A very great inferiority of numbers.'
And yet to this day, I do not recollect anything that has bean done
in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Sootland;
and whoever looks over the list of public officers, Civil and
military of that nation will find I believe that the North Britons
3
enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument." King on June
thirteenth significantly declared that "Expedients might be de-
4
vised as he conceived would give them all the security the nature
of things would admit of The articles of union between
E ; 3uand and Scotland furnish an example of such a provision in
favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that union was in agita-
tion, the 3ame language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller states was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The
articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found
an increase of prosperity and happiness."
Another argument advanced by those favoring equal representa-
tion to states was that it would give the minority a voice in
3. Farranl, "Records", I, 2.98.
4. Small states.
5. Farrand, "Records", I, 493.
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Btate affairs. On June 13 Wilson said the majority would always
rule the minority whenever it was possible. "That he declared to
be the basis of the trouble between England the oolonies; England
was jealous of the growing power of the oolonies and the result
was separation." He predicted the same result for the United States
g
if the majority were allowed to rule unchecked. On June 30
Ellsworth answered those who objected to equal representation in the
senate, "The power is given to a few to save them from being de-
stroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given to them
in both branches, the objection might have had weight. Is it a
novel thing that the few should have a check on the many? Is it not
the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of whioh so many
gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords,
who form so small a proporH ^n of the nation a negative on the laws
as a necessary defense of their peculiar rights agst the encroach-
ments of the Commons. No instance (of a Confederacy) has existed
7in which an equality of voices has not been exercised by it."
But the opponents of this plan likewise drew examples from England
on the ground tViat it would resemble the rotten borough system.
Judge Dana in xhe Massachusetts Convention brought out this com-
8
pari son. The rotten borough system was also mentioned in the
9
federal convention as a thing to be avoided.
In yet another way England furnished an example on this
phase of the construction of congress, the basis of representation.
6. Farrand, "Records", I, 605.
7. ibid, "Records", I, 484.
8. Elliot, "Debates", II, 49.
9. Bedford in this connection asked, "Are we to act with greater
purity than the rest of mankind?" Farrand, "Records", I, 491.
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Sotr.e wished a 1 rge house of representat ives, others a small one.
Lansing in the New York convention wanted such a system of proportion
ing congress as to give a large lower house. He argued that the
House of Commons had often been corrupted and a congress much
smaller would stand a still better chance.^ Wilson in the federal
convention on June 16 said that we should not disregard the lesson
pointed out in British government "that the smallest bodies are
notoriously the most corrupt."-^ But in the Pimsylvania convention
Wilson declared that he did not want congress to get too large. He
said that the House of Commons consisted of five hundred members
1?
and that this was too large, J Nicholas in the Virginia convention
expressed the same idea. He declared that the reason the king in
Great Britain never vetoed a bill was because he did not need to,
but instead exercised his influence before the bill was passed.
13
This he said would be true in any large assembly.
During the period of ratification some opponents of the con-
stitution held that thirty thousand were too many people for one
person to represent. Hamilton in the fifty-sixth number of the
"Federalist" pointed out that in England and Scotland "there will be
one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the
situation of 28,670 constituents. 11 Yet the value of freedom had
been maintained there and he held that one for 30,000 was sufficient
in America.
While the topic of the basis of representation wao being
discussed, countries other than England were mentioned but little
because real representative government wao to be found only in
England. France was referred to by Madison in a speech against pro-
10. Elliot, "Debates", 11,261*. 12. Elliot, "Debates", II, 442.
11. Farrand, "Records I, 254. 13. ibid, III, 13.
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portional representation alone4 given in the federal convention on
June 19. "The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representa-
tion; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmount-
able. The expedient proposed by them"*"4 was that all the states
should be thrown into one masi and a new partition be made into
thirteen equal parts..,. The dissimilarities existing in the rules
of property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of
the different states, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt.
It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most ab-
solute princes in Europe (K. of France) directed by the wisdom of
one of the most enlightened and patriotic ministers (Mr. Neckar)
that any age has produced to equalize in some pointB only the
15
different usages and regulations of the different provinces.
Quotations from a speech made by Madison in the federal convention
June 38 will sum up the points for which the less important states
of Europe were cited. Many men from the smaller states feared
that those states would be absorbed by the larger ones unless they
had special safeguards. Madison's notes record himself as saying,
"Carthage and Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting
their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses
of Austria and France were hostile a3 long as they remained the
greatest powers of Europe. England and France have succeeded to the
pre-eminence and to the enemity The contentions, not the coali-
tions of Sparta, Athens and Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller mem-
bers of the Araphyctionlc Confederacy.... what is the condition of
the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they
are exceedingly trampled upon and that they owe their safety as far
14. Certain members of the federal 'convention
15. Farrand, "Records", I, 321.
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as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the ri-
val banners of the preeminent members, partly to alliances with
neighboring Princes wiioh the Constitution of the Empire does not
prohibit. V/hat is the state of things in the lax system of the
Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about one half the people,
supplies about half of the money, and by her influence, silently
and indirectly govern the whole Republic. In a word, the two ex-
tremes before us are a perfect separation and a perfect incorpora-
tion of the thirteen States. In the first case, the smaller states
would have everything to fear from the larger. In the last they
would have nothing to fear."-^
European writers were mentioned very little in this connec-
tion. Madison on June 28 said, "What was the condition of the mem-
bers of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. Plutarch (Life of Themistacles)
will inform us that it happened but too often that the strongest
cities corrupted and a."ed the weaker, and that judgment went in
17favor of the more powerful party." In volume three of Farrand
are some "Observations on plan of government" by Pinckney which
were probably prepared for the convention in his own state. In
this is found the following, "This idea, of a just Representation,
seems to have been conformable to the opinions of the best writers
on the subject, that, in a confederated system, the members ought
to contribute according to their abilities, and have a vote in
proportion to their importance Montesquieu, who had very ma-
turely considered the nature for a confederated Government, gives
16. Farrand, "Records , " I, 448, 449. Paterson's notes on this speech
have inserted a note to the affect that Poland had been torn
apart by the larger states. 1,459.
17. ibid, I, 449.
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1 ft
the preference to the Lycian, which was formed upon this model."
As one goes through the source material of this period, he
usually finds the election of members of the legislature discussed
along with the qualifications of members and electors and then the
actual provisions for the election itself . In the convention on
July 36, Ellsworth did not want public debtors to be disqualified
as some men did. These, he sail, were excluded in England because
it gave undue power to the crown. This would not be the case in
19
the United States. Madison on August 10, "observed that the
British Parliament possesed the power of regulating the qualifica-
tions both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had
made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made
the changes in both cases subservient to the reviews of religious
parties." He desired the qualifications and provisions to be
definitely fixed in the constitution." 2^ So much for the qualifica-
tions of congress as a whole.
No case of a European precedent for the qualifications of
21
representatives was found. In general the reasons for the citizen-
ship qualifications for senators was likewise beoause of fear of
33foreign influence. Yet European precedent was frequently men-
18. Farrand, "Records" , III, 109
19. ibid, II, 136.
20. ibid, II, 250.
21. It was rather from fear of European influence that certain
qualifications for the representatives were embodied in the constitu-
tion. In the federal convention, August 13, Gerry "wished that in
the future the eligibility might be confined to natives. Foreign
powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expense to in-
fluence them. Persons having foreign attachments will be sent
among us and insinuated into our councils, in order to be made in-
struments for their purposes. Everyone knows the vast sums laid out
in Europe for secret services." Farrand, "Records", II, 268.
On the same day Col. Mason raised an objection to allowing nat-
uralized citizens being in the House of Representatives. "If
(cont. next pige)
x
\
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tioned as an argument for citizenship qualification of senators.
August 9 Pinckney showed that "as the Senate is to have the power
of making the treaties and managing our foreign affairs, there is
peculiar danger & impropriety in opening its door to those who
have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians
on this subject who made it death for any stranger to intrude his
2 3
voice into their legislature proceedings. * "Butler was decidedly
opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence
in the Country. They bring with them no"C only attachments to other
Countries; but ideas of Govt, so distinct from ours that in every
point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he him-
self had been called into public life within a short time after
his coming to America, his foreign habits, opinions & attachments
would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He
mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this
24
subject."
31 cont.
persons among us attained to G. - B. should work themselves into
our councils, a turn might be given to our affairs & particularly
to our commercial regulations which might have pernicious conse-
quences. The great House of British Merchants would spare no
pains to insinuate the instruments of their vices," Farrand,
"Records", II, 272.
Wilson, on the other hand, like many others, desired naturalized
citizens to be eligible for representatives. He held that such a
disqualification would keep foreigners from migrating to this
country. Farrand, "Records", II, 272.
Mason wanted a residence qualification. Without it rich men
would get In after having failed in their own state and use corrup-
tion. This was the case in England. Farrand, "Records", II, 318.
22. A typical statement of this fear is given in Madi son's notes
for Aug, 9. Gouverneur Morris was in favor of an extensive citizen-
ship. "Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to in-
crease the commerce of France; An Englishman, he will feel an equal
bias in favor of that of England." Farrand, "Records", II, 338.
33. Farrand, "Records", II, 335.
34. ibid, "Records", 11,336
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In the matter of the qualifications of voters, Holland was
used as an example. The idea was that suffrage should be broad.
On August7in the federal convention Butler declared that people
would be very jealous of the suffrage. "Abridgments of it tend to
the same revolution as in Holland, where they have at length thrown
all power into the hands <f the Senates, who fill up vacancies them-
35
selves, and form a rank aristocracy." But we find the custom in
England more often referred to. Here the franchise was largely
limited to freeholders. Some men would have such a qualification
copied in the constitution. Gouverneur Morris was one of these.
Mason objected to this and remarked rather tartly that some people
imagined that because the freehold was the qualification in England,
it was the only proper qualification. Madison then pointed out
that in England only a small proportion of representatives was
chosen by the freeholders and the greatest part was chosen by cities
26
and boroughs and it waa here where the most corruption was. On
the following day Gorham said Madison did not state the case
accurately. He went on, "Cities & large towns are not the seat of
the crown influence & corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs,
and not on account of the right which those who are not freeholders
have to vote, but of the smallnesa of the number who vote." Dur-
ing this discussion of qualifications for electors Franklin gave
an example of two Americcin seamen who were confined in a British
prison and of two British seamen who were confined in American
prisons. The former would not join their captors and fight against
25. Farrandi "Records" \ ' ii\
'
262!
*
26. ibid, 204.
27. ibid, 216. This is <n interesting example of the diverse opinions
held on the same illustration.
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their own country and the latter would. This, he Baid, was due to
the difference in the suffrage of the common people in America and
28
England. So then, we find England rather frequently mentioned
by two groups of people. Those who desired a property qualifica-
tion for electors found their model in England, On the other hand
certain persons said this very qualification was an evil and re-
sponsible for some of the wrungs in the British government and for
that reason should be avoided.
Turning now to the actual provisions for the election of
congressmen, we find a dearth of material on this subject also. On
August 9 in the federal convention the plan for having each house
prescribed the time, manner, and place of election was taken up.
Gorham declared, "It would be so improper to take this power from
the Natl. Legislature as to restrain the British Parliament from
regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving the business to
the counties themselves." But some considered this a dangerous
plan. In the Pennsylvania convention a member stated that if con-
gress could alter the time, place, and manner of elections, it
could do as the English parliament once did and extend its terra to
30
seven years, inferring that this would be dangerous.
When the question arose ae to how the members of the lower
house would get their seats, the advocates of popular election
pointed repeatedly to England as their model. Mason argued on
May 13 for an election of "the larger branch by the people.... It
28. Farrand, "Records", II, 204-305.
39. ibid, 240.
30. Elliot, "Debates", IV, 62.
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31
was, so to speak, our House of Commons." Other countries were also
referred to to prove the neoessity for popular election. For in-
stance, Madison on June 6 declared that the popular election of one
house was necessary in order to prevent the majority from getting
control of the minority. Otherwise he thought there would be a
conflict between the commercial and farming clabses or the debtor
and capitalist clashes. "In Greece & Rome the rich & poor, the
creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians and plebians alter-
nately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness , What a
source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of
Home, Athens, & their respective provinces: the former possessing
the power & the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be
separate objects of it?" In the "Federalist" likewise, reference
was made to ancient governments. In the sixtythird publication it
was pointed out that Athens before the reforms of Solon had been
governed by nine Archons elected by the people at large. It also
pointed out that in Carthage the legislature was elected by the
people; in Sparta, the Ephori; and in Rome, the Tribunes.
Similarly, history and contemporary governments were searched
in order to find a plan for the choosing of senators. In this
connection the English House of Lords was mentioned. This bo ;y held
its offiee for life and most members inherited their seat. No in-
stance was found of anyone advocating exactly this. But many
persons desired 6ome scheme of election whereby the senate would
have the force and strength of the House of Lords. On June 7
Dickinson moved "that the members (of the 3d branch ought to be
31. Farrand, "Records", I, 48
32. ibid, 135,
33. ibid, 150.
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ohosen) by the Individual Legislatures." One reason for this was
"because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished
characters, distinguished for their rank in life & their weight
of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House
of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely
to be chosen by the State Legislatures than in any other mode." 3 **
As in many other instances England served as an example when
the length of term of the congressmen was discussed. To this
country we find both those who favored long terms and those who
desired short terms turning for precedent. Soon after it was de-
cided to have a bi-cameral legislature, the members of the conven-
tion agreed that the senators should serve longer than the represent-
atives. The fact that the House of Lords served for life, however,
did not seem to mace a life senate desirable in America. But the
House of Lords was pointed to as an example of stability, which
was thought to be due largely to its long term of office.
The length of termed urged for representatives varied from
one to three years. Those who urged annual elections did so on the
grounds that it would prevent tyranny similar to that practiced by
34
parliament in England, especially the long-term parliaments. But
in answer to this it was urged that this was necessary where the
legislature was supreme as in England, but not in a country like
the United States where the constitution was superior to the
35
legislature. Dickinson in the federal convention on June 21
33. Farrand. "Records", I, 150.
34. General Heath in the Mass, convention urged annual elections
because the first Parliament in Europe was called by Con-
stantine the Great continued for one year. Elliot , "Debates"
,
II, 13.
35. See the flftythird number of the "Federalist."
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argued that in England annual elections were good because the
country was so small. But he urged that a country as large as
America should have a longer term and he suggested a three-year
term. Hamilton likewise wanted a three-year term, his argument be-
ing that the seven-year parliament in England did not, as some had
36
said, harm the spirit of democracy. Other men also argued that
the long parliaments in Great Britain were not harmful. A member
of the Virginia convention asked if the English were not quite a3
free with less frequent elections as they were when the elections
were held annually. "Do not," he inquired," writers agree that
life, liberty, and property are nowhere better secured than in
Great Britain, and that security arises from their Parliaments
37being chosen for seven years?" But some supporters of the long
term went even farther than that and declared that England was
actually in better circumstances with a long parliament than she
33
had been under the shorter ones.
Writers on government were seldom mentioned while the length
of term was under consideration. A few men drew arguments from
Sidney and Montesquieu in favor of a short term and frequent
elections. In the New York convention it was pointed out that
Cidney and Montesquieu held that annual elections would bring about
the "ardent affections for public weal," and for this reason annual
39
elections were to be desired. Liker/ise in the Massachusetts con-
36. Farrand, "Records" I, 363.
37. Elliot, "Debates", II, 15.
38. ibid, 17.
39. ibid, 242.
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vention Montesquieu was quoted as saying, "The greatness of power
must be compensated by the brevity of the duration; most legislators
have fixed it to a year; a longer space would be dangerous." 4^
Let us see now to what extent European practice exerted an
influence on the provisions for giving congressmen certain privi-
leges. The makers of the constitution saw in England examples of
the abuse of privilege and so were determined to give few to con-
gress. Charles Pinckney speaking in the senate March 8,1800 said,
"They well knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges
had been exercised in Great Britain and were determined no such
authority should ever be exercised here."4^ In like manner England
was referred to when the question of making senators and represen-
tatives eligible to other officers was discussed. June 33 Gorham
moved to strike out the provision making congressmen ineligible
to office during their term and for one year afterward, "It
was true abuses had been displayed in G.B. but no one cd.
say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due in-
fluence of the Gov't nor what might have ensued in case the con-
trary theory had been tried." This motion was opposed by Butler
and Mason on the ground that as in England the congressmen would
attempt to get offices for themselves and their friends and would
43
corrupt the government. Montesquieu was also used as an argument
against any such eligibility. Butler on June 23 is quoted as say-
ing, "The great Montesquieu says it is unwise to entrust persons
with power, which by being abused operates to the advantage of those
40. Elliot, "Debates", II, 3.
41. The framers of the constitution.
42. Farrand, "Records", III, 386.
43. ibid, I, 376.
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entrusted with it." 44
Besides wishing congressmen ineligible to other office,
certain men wanted them serve without salary. Grayson in the
Virginia convention declared himself in favor of this and cited
the English house of commons as an example. 4^ Sedgwick in the
Massachusetts convention urged that it would be safe to allow con-
gressmen to set their own salary. He pointed out that it was pos-
46
sible in England for two hundred years but they had never done it.
A legislature having been provided, it was necessary to
provide for meetings of it and for a quorum. Only one instance was
found in which European precedent was forwarded in regard to meet-
ings. On August 7 Sherman "was decided for fixing the time, as well
as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body. .. .frequent meet-
ings of Parliament were required at the Revolution in England as
an essential safeguard of liberty." 4 ''' One instance also was found
of a reference to Europe on the question as to what a quorum for
conducting business should be. August 10 Mercer "was for leaving
it to the legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where
the requisite number is small & no inconveniency has been ex-
4ftper ienced.
"
European governments were also searched when the question
of suffrage in the two houses of congress was discussed. Instances
were found of the mention of the practice in England, Holland, and
45. Elliot, "Debates", III, 371. 46. Elliot, "Debates" , 11,53.
47. Farrand, "Records", 11,199. On this same day Gouverneur Morris
moved to strike out Deo, and insert May for the time of
meeting. "It might frequently happen that our measures ought
to be influenced by those in Europe, which were ^enerallv
planned during the winter and of which intelligence woulS
reach us in the spring.
"
48. Farrand, "Redords", II, 251, 44. Farrand, "Records", I, 391.
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Germany. On June 11 Sherman proposed each state to have one vote
in the senate, saying, "The House of Lords in Eng. . . . had certain
particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an
equal vote with the House of Commons. that they may be able to defend
their rights."^ Ellesworth likewise wished the suffrage to remain
the same as under the confederacy and made a motion to that effect
on June 39. He held that the large states could still maintain
their superiority as Holland had done in the Dutch confederacy.^
Wilson objected to equal suffrage in the senate because the mi-
nority would rule the majority. Ellsworth said this was the case
in England because the House of Lords was only a small part of the
51people and had a negative on laws. Madison, however
,
argued for
proportional votes in the senate. He gave the Dutch confederacy
as an example. In this he declared that the votes of the provinces
were equal but that Holland controlled the whole republic because
she supplied half of the money. He expected the same result in
the United States with equal suffrage. a
Just how much and what powers should a legislature con-
structed on these lines exercise? This was indeed a perplexing
question, some holding that the sum total was too much. Kingsley
declared in the Massachusetts convention that this was the case
and he pointed to the seizure of Rome by the decemvri and to the
manner in which the English parliament continued itself in power.
He thought the American congress could do the same through its con-
trol of the elections, purse, and army. 53 But on the other hand
49. Farrand, "Records M
,
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51. ibid, 484.
53. ibid, II, 9,
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-46-
some held that congress did not have enough power to prevent the
encroachment s of other departments. Lee in the Virginia convention
answered this by declaring, "If the House of Commons in England,
possessing less power, are now able to withstand the power of the
crown,- if that House of cotnttions, which has been undermined by
corruption in every age, with far less powers than our representa-
tives possess, is still able to contend with the executive of that
country, what danger to fear that our representatives cannot
successfully oppose the encroachments of the other branches of the
government?"®
In aiiition to comparing the aggregate of the powers of
congress with those exercised by similar bodies in Europe, the
framers and ratifiers looked to European practice when they gave
congress certain definite powers. To the English constitution
we owe the provision that money bills must originate in the lower
house.^ On June 13 Gerry moved to restrain the senate from orig-
inating money bills and pointed to the British constitution as a
reabon for his motion.^ Randolph also saw in the British govern-
ment a reason for this discrimination when on August 11 he re-
marked that if inequality existed in the senate, the large Btates
would consider it as an aristocratic body and expect it to be
guarded against as in Great Britain. 5 ''' Some men even went so far
54. Elliot, "Debates", III, 43.
55. In all the discussion on this subject, only one reference to
another country was found. Mason on August 13 wanted the
house to have this power. He "compared the case to Poyning's
law & and signified that the House of Reps, might be rendered
by degrees like the parliament of Paris, the mere depository
of decrees of the Senate unless it only had the power to orig-
inate money bills." Farrand, "Records,* II, 374.
56. Farrand, "Records", I, 233,
57. Farrand, "Records", II, 363.
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as to irish the senate to not even have the power of amending money
bills. Grayson in the Virginia convention objected to allowing the
semate to have anything to do with money bills. He pointed out
58
that in England the House of Lords could not amend them.
But those who desired that the senate should exercise this
po.vsr along with the house declared that conditions in the United
States were different from those in England. In the first place
the senate would be a representative body and there was no necessity
of guarding against it as in England, Then tuo, it was urged that
there would be no executive with po?er to dissolve congress when
altercations arose, as in England. Wilson states this very forcibly
when he said that "Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her Parliamt
in order to terminate one of those obstinate desputes between the
two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the crown, no
59
one jan say .That the result would have been." It was likewise
contended that it was not necessary to give one house precedence
over the other in money matters because the executive in England
60
was hereditary and would have more sympathy with the up;:er house.
Yet another danger was expected by some to arise from this provision
Wilson declared that the house of representatives would put "riders"
61
on a bill and he cited a case in England where this had been done.
In the matter of money bills meaning a "tax bill" then, England
served as a model even though many argued that the case was not
analagous.
Closely allied to the power of originating money bills is the
power of taxation. Some objected to allowing the same body to have
58. Elliot, "Debates", III, 376,317
59. Farrand, "Records", I, 546.
60. ioid, III, 156.
61. ibid, II, 375.
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control of the sword and purse. England was cited as an example of
this.^2 On the matter of indirect taxes greatest dispute arose,
some holding that congress should have this power, others that it
should not. The former cited various European countries for prece-
dent. In the Connecticut convention Ellsworth urged that all nations
had Been the necessity and propriety of raising money by indrect
taxation. The Swiss raised most of their entire revenue on salt,
England raised eight million pounds per annum on consumption;
6 3
Holland used indrect taxes almost ex-clusively . Hamilton in the
twelfth number of "Federalist" conciliated the free-holders and
property owners by pointing out that they will not be called upon
to pay taxes according to wealth. He went on to show that indirect
taxes had been used more than direct ones even in Great Britain
where the government was very strong. France also was cited in
this essay as an argument for indirect taxes. Gorham in the
Massaohus&ett s convention was in favor of an import on luxuries as
making the rich pay. He showed that in England and France the taxes
64
were as high as one hundred per cent on sor.;e articles.
Some consideration was also given to taxes on exports, but in
general it was held from the first to be a bad idea. Gerry on
August 31 in the federal convention opposed taxes on exports, saying
that it would enable the central government to oppress the states
as England was oppressing Ireland. 65 A slightly different view
was held by soma who thought that eventually taxes on exports would
be good but that the country was not yet ready for them. In this
62. Elliot, "Debates", II, 195.
63. ibid, 192.
64. ibid, 106.
65. Farrand, "Records", II, 363.
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connection it was pointed out that England was taxing wool which was
exported from the country .66
There was fear that congress would have too much taxing power.
A good example of this was given when Williams in the New york con-
vention urged that congress should not have ao much power in this
field. He said, "In England, for instance, the people are not only
oppressed with a variety of other heavy taxes, 'out, if my informa-
tion is right, absolutely pay taxes for births, marriages, and
deaths, for the light of heaven and even for paying their debts.
What reason have we to suppose that our rulers will be more sympa-
thetic and heap lighter, burdens upon their constituents than the
67
rulers of other countries?"
Some men desired congress to have certain powers of taxation
specified in the constitution but did not want it to have the power
to lay new taxes. Realizing this, Hamilton in the thirtieth number
of the "Federalist" pointed out that such action would lead to
great tyranny. He drew an illustration from the Ottoman Empire in
which the sovereign had no right to impose a new tax. He wrote,
"The consequence is that he permits the ....governors of provinces
to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of
them the sums of which he stands in need.
"
European writers were also repeatedly referred to in the
matter of taxation. Montesquieu being most often mentioned. Wilson
in the Pennsylvania convention quoted Montesquieu in references to
66. Farrand, "Records", II, 362,
67. Elliot, "Debates", II, 340.
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the tax system of the Lyoian confederacy and Holland. That writer
gave Holland as contributing according to power, the Lycian cities
according to suffrages. He quoted, "Were I to give a model of an
68
excellent confederate republic, I should pitch upon that of Lycia.
"
Williams in the New York convention said, "The great Montesquieu
says that a poll tax upon the person is indicative of despotism,
and that a tax upon proper.ty is congenial with the spirit of free
government.
"
u^
As has been stated in the introduction, commerce with Europe
played an important part in the formation of the constitution. But
it was in the light of what would happen in the future. Only a few
references to European practice in the matter of controlling com-
merce are to be found in the material of this period. Madison in
the forty second "Federalist" said that the necessity of regulating
trade between states was shown in other countries." In Switzerland
each canton is forced to allow goods to pass through it. In
Germany it is a law of the empire that the provinces and states
shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers or passages with-
out the consent of the emperor and the diet.... In the Union of
Netherlands, its members could not establish imposts disadvantageous
to their neighbors, without general permission."
In regard to the regulation of slave trade certain members
of the federal convention wished to have a provision in the consti-
tution to the effect that it should cease. Mason pointed to
68. Elliot, "Debates", II, 483. He also quoted from Neckar, "Popula-
tion can therefore be only looked on as an exact measure of com-
parison when the provinces have resources nearly equal; but even
this imperfect rule of proportion ought not to be neglected; and
of all the objects which may be subjected to a determined and
positive calculation, that of the taxes to the population.
"
69. Elliot, "Debates", II, :$40.
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European countries that hac3 abolished the clave trade. He mentioned
Greeoe, Sicily, and Rome. Dickinson said that France and England
excluded the importation of slaves and that Greece and Rome had
been made unhappy by them. But Pinckney declared that even if
slavery was wrong, it was justified by the rest of the world, and
he cited Greeoe, Rome, France, England, and Holland as countries
70
in which slavery had existed or did exist.
The next power given to oongrees which concerns us is the
power to make uniform rules of bankruptcy. One instance was found
of a reference to European laws on this matter. Sherman, "observed
that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable with death by the
laws of England & he did not chuse to grant a power by which that
71
might be done here.
Coming now to the provision allowing congress to keep an army
we find that, in the main, Europe affected the makers of the con-
stitution in their desire for a standing army by furnishing a cause
for such an army. Again and again in the records is emphasized the
idea that a standing army was necessary to protect against possible
attack from Europe. However, England was referred to as a prece-
dent in the matter of standing armies. Some argued that the legis-
lature should not have the power to keep a standing army because it
would be dangerous. An excellent example of this feeling was
given when Mason said in the Massachusetts convention, "Was it not
with this that Caesar passed the Rubicon, and laid prostrate the
liberties of his country Y .... Britain attempted to enforce her
arbitrary measures by a standing army."*^ But at the same time
70. Farrand, "Records", II, 370-373.
71. ibid, 489.
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En^land was cited as a precedent for giving congress the right to
control a standing army in times of peace. Taylor in the
Massachusetts convention declared that it was a new idea that the
legislature could not keep a standing army. He showed that Charles
II had kept 5000, James II, 30,000 and when William III came to the
throne of England "it was declared unconstitutional to raise or keep
a standing army, in the time of peace without consent of legisla-
ture. " But it could be kept with the consent of the legislature
73
and this should be the situation in the United States. He also
argued that there was more danger from a standing army in England
because of the seven-year legislature than in America with two-
year congress. Another objection to the plan as it was proposed,
was that con-re^ would hava both the power of declaring and wag-
ing war and it was pointed out that in England the king declared
74
war and the House of Co :..ons gave the means of carrying it on.
In aidition to England's actual experience in the matter of stand-
ing armies, one English writer was quoted. In the Massachusetts
convention it was pointed out that Pitt had declared standing armies
to be dangerous and that instead the militia should be kept in
75
order.
One other power of c ngress had a European precedent. This was
the power to provide a capitol. Some objected to allowing congress
to govern the capitol on the ground that it would be abused as in
Europe. Grayson in the Virginia convention thought that exclusive
jurisdiction should be guarded against because it might result
in exclusive immunities and privileges as in Europe. He said that
73. Elliot, "Debat s n
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in Russia and Prussia every possible step has been taken to aggran-
dize the capitol. ?6
Having provided congress with certain powers, the question
arose as to how much publicity should be given to the acts of con-
gress. It was urged that there should be no secret meetings and
the fact that in England the sessions of parliament were open to
the public was referred to.? 7 In connection with a journal said
it was absurd to expect a great body to publish everything and he
showed that in Great Britain some things were not published. 78
V.
European Influence u -on the Executive.
We have seen that Europe had its effect upon the form of gov-
ernment in general and upon the provisions for congress. Let us
see now to what extent Europe furnished specific examples in the
organization of the executive. We shall see that nistory and gov-
ernment were searched on the questions of the number of the execu-
tive, length of term, the method of election, qualifications, salary
and powers.^-
The fear of a monarchy led many influential men to desire a
plural executive and they drew, in the main, their arguments for
this from English precedent. It was argued that in England a coun-
cil of revision was necessary to advise the king and to be respons-
ible for the acts of the king. This really amounted to a plural
1. The impeachment of the president will be discussed in connec-
#
tion .with
#
the judiciary.
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executive and it was held that Americans should follow this example
Sherman in the Philadelphia convention on June 4 stated this idea
very clearly when he said, "Even in G.B. the king has a council;
and though he appoints it himself its advice has its weight with
2
him, and attracts the confidence of the people." But in answer
to this, it was again and again pointed out that there was no
analogy between the English government with its hereditary monarch
and the United States, in which the executive would be elective. 3
Those who were opposed to the plural executive also drew il-
lustrations from history showing that such plans had not worked in
the past. In the "Federalist" 4 it was pointed out that Roman
history "records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from
the dissensions between the consuls, and between military Tribunes
who were at times substituted for consuls." This statement was als
made, "The Decemvirs of Rome, whose name denotes their number,
were more to be dreaded in their usurpation than any one of them
would have been. It also mentioned that the Achaean League had
had two praetors and had been compelled to abolish one of these.
Wilson thought that a plural executive "would probably produce a
tyranny as bad as the thirty Tyrants of Athens, or as the Decemvirs
of Rome."s Again, Butler on June 3 in answer to Randolph, who op-
posed a single executive, declared that a plural executive would
tend to sectionalism especially disastrous in military matters. Pie
referred to the "opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in
which a plurality of military heade distracted Holland when
2. Farrand, "Records", I, 97,
3. An excellent example of this is in the "Federalist" No. 60,
4. No, 60
5. Farrand, "Records", I, ?4.

threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for
directing the force to this part, another to that part of the
country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice. "^ Pierce
in his notes for this day, reports Butler as saying that "when he
was in Holland the States general were obliged to give up their
7power to a French man to direct their military operations.
"
Even after it was decided that there should be a single execu-
tive, many wished a council of revision as a check on the powers of
the president. Dr. Franklin was one of the strongest advocates of
this plan. He believed that if the executive were single we would
be harassed like Poland with factions for the election of success-
ors. Franklin also thought that Holland was at that time tending
toward a hereditary monarchy and he felt that such would be the
Q
case in the United States unless the executive were plural.
Franklin wanted this council of revision especially in the matter
of appointment. He felt that one person could not appoint well and
as an illustration, he said that many bad governors had been sent
to the colonies from England where the appointive powers lay with
the king only."
Two extremes were urged in regard to the number of years for
which the executive so constituted should serve. On the one hand
were those who desired a lon^-term executive, some even wanting a
monarchy. Others desired an executive with a short term not re-
10
eligible to election. Of the former, Hamilton was perhaps the
most ardent and in a speech of June 18, he drew from history il-
6. Farrand, "Records", I, 89.
7. ibid, 92.
8. Franklin, "Works", V, 144.
9. Farrand, "Records", 11,54*2.
10. No instance of a reference to European countries as an example of
a short-term executive was found.
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lustrations of hie points. He thought that no good executive could
be established on republican principles. He declared that the
English government was the only model on this. "The Hereditary in-
terest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and
his personal emoluments so great that he was placed above the danger
of being corrupted from abroad- and at the same time was both suf-
ficiently independent and sufficiently controlled, to answer the
purpose of the institution at home. One of the weak sides of Re-
publics was their being liable to foreign influence and corruption.
Men of little character acquiring great power become easily the
tools of intermeddling neighbors. Sweden was a striking instance.
The French and English had each their parties during the late
Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the
former . »H
However, while the constitution was being ratified and many
were objecting that the term of the executive was too long, Hamilton
argued in favor of the four-year term. He wrote, "If a British
House of Commons from the most feeble beginnings, from the mere
power of assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax,
have by rapid strides reduced the prerogative of the crown and the
privileges of the nobility within the limits they conceived to be
compatible with the principle of a free government, while they
raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a co-equal branch
of the legislature, " he urged that we need have no fear from an
13
executive elected for four years.
How should this executive be elected? It waa suggested by
1 %
some that he be elected by the legislature. The opponents of this
ii! *Farrandi "Records", I, 239. ' 12, "Federalist", No. 61
13. Pickney was greatly in favor of this plan of election.
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plan said that it would caute corruptions as had been the case in
Poland14 and would make the president dependent upon the legislature.
Gouverneur Morris spoke Warmly and frequently against the proposed
plan of election by the legislature. July 34, he said, "Some leader
of party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration,
will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting
him. This was the way in which the King of England was got out, he
meant the real King, the Minister. This was the way In which Pitt.
(Ld. Chatham) forced himself into place. Fox was for rushing the
matter still farther. If he had carried his India bill, which he
was very near doing, he would have made the Minister, the King in
form almost as well as in substance. Our president will be the
British Minister, yet we are about to make him appoint able by the
Legislature." 15 On the following day Madison made a speech on this
subject. He pointed out that if the executive were elected by the
national legislature, the office would be open to bribery on the part
of foreign nations. He said that such had been the case in Germany
until the emperor became hereditary, the election interested all
Europe and was much influenced by foreign influence. In Poland
the election of the magistrate "has at ail times produced the
most eager interference of foreign princes, and has in fact at
1
6
length slid entirely into foreign hands." Europe influenced the
provisions for the election of the president in a negative way,-
14. Farrand, "Records," II, 30.
15. Farrand, "Records", II, 104. In England where the ministry
fails to receive the support of the House of Comu.ons, it
"goes to the country" ;i,e. there is an election. If the
country returns supporters of the ministry, there is no
change of ministry. But if the opposition returns a majority
to the house, the ministry is overthrown and a new one
comes into power.
IS. Farrand, "Records", II, 110.
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it showed that election by the national legislature would not do.
The constitution next proviies certain qualifications for the
executive. Only one instance was found of a reference to European
countries when the qualifications of the president were eing dis-
cussed. July 24 Wilson said that age did not necessarily mean lack
of ability in performance of duties. He mentioned a Doge of Venice
who was elected after he was eighty. Popes also were often old
when elected and they were very capable people. "What an irreparable
loss would the British Jurisprudence have sustained had the age of
50 been fixed there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness
to serve the public. The great luminary (Ld. Mansfield) held his
17
seat for 30 years after his arrival at that age,"
The constitution provides that the president shall receive com-
pensation for his services. In the records of this period, only
one perbon referred to European precedent in regard to the salary
of the president. Franklin wished the executive to receive no re-
muneration. He did not want the executive to be paid except enough
to defray expenses. "Place before the eyes of such (ambitious and
avaricious] men a post of honor that shall at the same time be
a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain
it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British
gov't so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources
of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the nation,
distracting its councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless and
mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable
terms of peace. In answer to charges that suitable men cannot
be found to serve for nothing, Franklin said that "The high sheriff
17 i ' Far rand,' ' "Records "i ' II,' * i03,
*
18. ibid, I, 83.
J
-59-
of a county in England is an honorable office, but not a profitable
one." It was expensive and not sought for. The members of judicial J
department of France did not reoeive enough to pay expenses.
^
Having provided an executive, the makers of the constitution
must need3 decide with what powers he should be vested. These
were the po.7er of appointment, the treaty making power, and the
veto
.
In respect to the power of appointment, England served as an
example in which this power was too strong. Dickinson on June 3
urged that the executive should not be of unlimited power. He held
that the weight of the British crown lay in the fact that there were
certain attachments to it." Y/hen this point was brought up later
on August 24, Sherman objected to the phrase, "and shall appoint
officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this constitution
He thought that some should be appointed this way but that others
21
should not, especially officers in the army in time of peace.
He declared that "herein lay the corruption in G. Britain. If the
executive can model the army, he may set up an absolute government;
taking advantage of the close of a war and an army commanded by
his creatures." Roger Sherman speaking in the first house of rep-
resentatives22 said, "The convention, who formed this constitution,
thought it would tend to secure the liberties of the people, if
they prohibited the president from the sole appointment of all offi-
cers. They knew that the crown of Great Britain, by having that
prerogative, has been enabled to swallow up the whole adminstration;
the influence of the crown upon the Legislature subjects both
19. Farrand, "Records", i, 84-35.
20. ibid, I, 36.
21. ibid, 11,405.
22. June 19,1785.
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Houses to Its will and pleasure." He pointed out that perhaps in
England the people wanted that. But, he said, in America, they did
not and the president was not ;-iven the sole appointive power. 2^
In the matter of treaty making, there was one group of men
who desired the president alone to have this power. Mercer on
August 15 expressed this idea in the constitutional convention and
cited. England as his precedent. 24 At first it seemed as if the
president would be given the sole treaty making power. When it
was suggested that the legislature should participate in this, there
was always an objection to it and England was pointed to as an
example. For instance, on August 33 Gouverneur Morris wanted as an
amendment to the treaty-making power of the president, "but no
Treaty shall be binding on the U.S. which is not ratified by law."
This was immediately objected to. Wilson declared, "In the most
important Treaties, the King of G. Britain being obliged to resort
to parliament for the execution of them, is under the same fetters
35
as the ammendment of Mr. Morris will impose on the Senate."
Butler, however, was greatly in favor of the co-operation of the
legislature in the making of treaties and he too drew examples from
history. He thought it would be a guard against "ambitious and
corrupt Presidents He mentioned the late perfidious policy of
the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of
Marlbro ' to prolong the war of which he had the management . "26
There was expressed again and again while the constitution
was being ratified, the fear that the president was not sufficiently
33. Farrand, "Records", ill, 35?.
24. Farrand, "Records", II, 297.
25. ibid, II, 393-393.
26. ibid, II, 541. Sept. 7.
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checked In the treaty-making power. But it was just as often pointed
out that in England, the king has the entire power to make treaties
and that the provisions In the constitution providing for the ap-
proval of the senate did not give the president as much power as the
king of England had. 37 A speaker in the convention of South Caroline
38
declared, "The king of England when he concluded one, did not
think himself warranted to go further than to promise that he would
endeavor to induce his Parliament to sanction lt,^9
But on the other hand there were those among the ratifiers
who would invest the president with the sols treaty-making power.
These drew examples from England and France. Rutledge in the South
Carolina Convention said that in England treaties were not necessar-
ily ratified and he pointed to the treaty of peace with the United
States as an example. Another speaker in this same convention showed
that edicts in France did not have to be registered and "even the
30
kings of England had power to make treaties of peace or war."
Another side of treaty-making may perhaps be discussed here
although it is a little beside the point. This phase is whether or
not a treaty should be the supreme law of the land. Henry in the
Virginia convention urged that it should not be. Madison in answer
to him showed that such was the case in England and he referred to
Blackstone's "Commentaries" as his authority.. Henry argued that
treatijs were not on the same footing as in England. Nicholas in
turn quoted from Blackstone to show that they were and he further
showed that neither the king nor the president could make a treaty
2?! ' Elliot)' "Debates % 'ivi ' 12Q.
'
38. Treaty.
29. Elliot, "Debates," II, 271.
30. El 1 lot, "Debates, " II, 367-368
. In answer it was declared that
treaties in England were discussed in parliament.
31. ibid, 501.
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32
which was contrary to the constitution of the country.
J
But moot
men realized the necessity of having treaties supreme in the land
and binding on every subject. Pinckney in the South Carolina con-
veation declared, "Indeed the doctrine that the king of Great Britain
may make a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind
his subjects, is* asserted by the best writers on the laws and con-
stitution of England- particularly by Judge Blackstone, who, in
the first of his Commentaries, (ch.7, p. 257) declares 'that it is
the king '3 prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances, and
that no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, or
annul them. 1 If treaties entered into by congress are not to be
neld in the same sacred li
c
ght in America, what foreign nation will
have any confidence in us Burlamaqui (French), another writer
of great reputation on political law, says 'that treaties are ob-
ligatory on the subjects of the powers who enter into treaties; they
are obligatory as conventions between the contracting powers; but
33they have the force of law with respect to their subjects.'"
Barnwell in the South Carolina convention observed "that the mo3t
free and enlightened notions of the world had a federal head, in
which this power was established- he meant the Amphictyonic council
of the Greeks, which was the palladium of their united liberties, and
until destroyed by the ambition of a few of the states of Greece,
was revered by that jealous people as a cornerstone of their federal
union. 1,34
There were three contrary ideas which were presented when
32. Elliot, "Debates", II, 506-508.
33. ibid, IV, 278-279.
34. ibid, 223.
I
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-he question of the president's veto was discussed. In the first
place, there were those who desired the executive to have an abso-
lute veto. Their main argument was drawn from England. June 4
"I£ was mentioned (by Col. Hamilton) that the King of G.E. had not
exerted his negative since the Revolution" and their power was con-
sidered harmless, 35 Gouvcrneur Morris also desired the president
to have a veto, saying that it would be a provision against the
popular government and would be a weapon if there were an attempt
to overthrow the executive. If it were overturned, tyranny would
be the result as in England. Wilson also declared that after the
destruction of the king of Great Britain that a more pure and un-
mixed tyranny sprang up in parliament than before.
On the other hand there were those who desired that the exe-
cutive should have a negative, but a qualified one. One method pro-
posed was to have the judges participate as a revisory council
with the president. This committee and the president was to have
the power of vetoing the bills passed by congress. Wilson July
81 urged that this would be necessary in order that the jurisdic-
tion of the judges should not be evaded. But Gorham opposed this
saying that it would not be necessary. "The judges in England have
no such additional provision for their defense, yet their jurisdic-
37tion is not evaded. 11 Another argument for associating the judges
with the executive in the exercise of the veto was that the presi-
dent would need the support of the judges. Gouverneur Morris
brought this out in the convention July 21, when he urged that there
35. Farrand, "Records", 1,98. Franklin answered that the reason the
king had not done this was because parliament was so bribed
that it passed only what the king wanted.
38. ibid, II, 399.
37. ibid, 73.

-64-
waa a difference between the English king and the president. He
held that the former had so much prerogative that he would never
surrender any of it, while in the United States the executive would
be weak and need the help and support of the judges.
Against this it fas argued that the association of the ju-
diciary and the executive would violate the separation of powers.
July 21 Madison said that he could not see the objection to the
association of judges in the revisionary power that it would vio-
late the separation of power, England was the best example of this
separation of power and there "it was not omy the practice to ad-
mit the judges to a seat in the legislature, and in the Executive
Councils, and to submit to their previous examination all laws of
a certain description, but it was a part of their constitution that
the Executive might negative any law whatever; a part of their
constitution which had been universally regarded as calculated for
the preservation of the whole. "39 Madison held that the associa-
tion of the judges with the executive would not violate the theory
of the separation of powers.
There was some objection to the plan which was finally a-
dopted, the power of the president to veto a bill with the provi-
sion that a two-thirds vote would overrule the veto, Madison
thought that if a proper proportion of the legislature were re-
quired to overrule the president's veto, it would amount to the
same thing as no veto because no man would be so strong as to defy
the legislature." "The Xing of G.3. with all his splendid attri-
butes would not be able to withstand ye unanimous and eager wisheb
of both houses of parliament." 4^
36. Farrand, "Records «, II, 76.
39. ibid, 77.
40. ibid, I, 100.
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In the other extreme position were those men who dssired that
the executive should have no negative at all. Luther Martin said
that the precedent of the king's veto in England would not apply.
He held that the king was a separate and distinct estate in
England with distinct rights and it was necessary for the king to
have this veto to preserve his rights. Dut in the United States
the executive was only an official of the government and he did not
41
need this power. It was urged in the Pennsylvania convention
not to give the president the veto power because it was unnecessary
42
and would not be exercised, as -/as the case in England.
Although it was not incorporated in the constitution, yet there
was a great deal of discussion on the question of giving the
central government the power to veto laws passed by the various
states and perhaps it will not be beyond the field of this paper
to include a brief discussion of this. In the main, England
43furnished the example. Madison in his preface to his notes wrote
that this negative "was suggested by the negative in the head of the
British Empire, which prevented collisions between the parts and
44'
the whole and between the parts themselves." Pinckney in some
observations on the constitution said that although the colonies
revolted from Great Britain, they never objected to the negative
41. Farrand, "Records] " mi'aosl*
43. Elliot, "Debates", II, 472. Wilson replied that there was no
reason why it should not be effectively exercised.
43, Pinckney declared the lack of such a negative and consequently
a strong executive was in part the cause of the weakness of
the ancient confederacies of Greece, and of the Helvetic and
Bolgic Leagues. Farrand, "Records, " III, 114.
44. Farrand, "Records," III, 549.
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of the king. He went on, "As a part of hie gov't it was considered
45
proper. Are we now less a part of the Federal Government than we
were then of the 3ritish?" 4a But Lladison was the staunch supporter
of this plan and again and again urged that the central government
have the power to veto state acts. Typical were his statements of
July 17 whan he declared, "Its utility is sufficiently displayed in
the British System. Nothing could maintain the harmony & subordina-
tion of the various part^ of the empire but the prerogative by which
the crown, stifles in the birth every act of every part tending
to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is some-
times misapplied thro' ignorance or a partiality to one particular
part of the empire: but we have not the same reason to fear such
misapplications in our system.
VI.
European Influence upon the Judiciary.
In the fourth place Europe affected the third great depart-
ment of government, the judiciary. The practice on the continent
was discussed in connection with the impeachment powers of congrebs,
the court system proper, the definition of treason, the provisions
regarding habeas corpus and ex post facto laws, and the bill of
rights
.
»•.........««. ••••.••••.*...
45. South Carolina.
46. Farrand, "Records", III, 114.
47. Pinckney urged that this power be given to congress. Lansing
asked if a gentleman from one state could judge a law to
operate in another. This, he declared, would be worse than
the English negative. Farrand, "Records" I, 337.
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Hamilton in the sixtyfourth "Federalist" wrote that the model
for the plan of impeachment was taken from Great Britain in which
the House of Commons preferred impeachment and the House of Lords
decided upon the case. Similarly a member of the Pennsylvania
convention while defending the plan for impeachments declared, "The
Houoe of Lords, in Great Britain are judges in the last resort in
all civil cases, and, besides, having the power of impeachment."^"
So, then, the general plan for impeachment was taken from the
En.lish plan as it was then. 3
Most men of this time feared and abhorred anything that
savored of monarchy. The provisions for the impeachment of the
president were put into the constitution because of this fear. It
was argued from examples in history that executives which were not
impeachable were dangerous. An illustration was drawn from Holland
by Franklin. He mentioned July 2 the case of the Prince of Orange
1. Elliot, "Debates," II, 554.
2. Here too, Patrick Henry violently opposed the constitution. In
the Virginia convention he declared, "But I beg gentlemen to
consider the .American impeachment. What is it? It is a mere
sham - a mere farce. When they do any thing derogatory to
the honor or interest of their country, they are to try them-
selves. Is it so in England? The history of that country
shows that they have blocks and gibbets. The violators of the
public interest have been tried justly and impartially, and
perished by those necessary instruments of justice. Can there
be any security where offenders mutually try one another? I
hope gentlemen will consider the necessity of amendment in
this clause," Elliot, "Debates, III, 512, But such objections
were very rare.
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during the late war. He said, "An argreement was made between
France and Holland; by which their two fleete were to unite at a
certain time and place. The Du t ch fleet did not appear. Every-
body began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected that the
Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This suspicion pre-
vailed more and more. Yet as he could not be impeached and no regu
lar examination took place, he remained in his office, and strength-
ening his own party, as the party opposed to him became formable,
he gave birth to the most violent animosities & contentions. Had
he been impeachable, a regular & peaceable inquiry would have
taken place and he would if quilty have been duly punished if inno-
cent restored to the confidence of the public."** It was also urged
by some that while hereditary executives were open to bribery, an
elective one would be still more so, Gourverneur Morris voices
this opinion when on July 3 he declared that an elective executive
might be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust. He went
on, "One would think the king of England well secured agst bribery.
He has, as it were, a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles
II was bribed by Louie XIV. " Then he declared that bribery could
be expected still more where the executive did not have such a
personal interest in the country. 4 Ezra Stiles in his diary gave
the following reasons for making the president impeachable, "As to
a President, it appeared to the Opin. of Convention, that he end
be a Character respectable by the Nations as well as by the foederal
3. Farrand, "Records, " 11,67. King remarked that the Statholder
was not the same as the American presiient. The former was
in for life and needed impeachment. The latter was elected
periodically and did not need impeachment.
4. Farrand, "Records", II, 68-69.
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Enpire. To this end that as much Power shd be given him as oould
be consistently with guardg against all possibility of his ascend-
ing in a Tract of years or Ages to Despotism & absolute Monarchy -
of waich all were cautious. Nor did it appear that any Members in
Convention had the least idea of insidiously lay of the Founda
of a future Monarchy like the European or Asiatic ?ilonarchiss either
Antient or modern. But were unamiously guarded and firm against
every Thing of this Ultimate Tendency. Accordingly they meant to
give considerable weight a3 supreme Executive, but fixt him depend-
5
ent on the States at large, and at all times impeachable. "
Turning now to the court system, we find only a few references
on this. On June 5 Vinson and Madison moved "that the national
legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." To this
Butler replied, "We must follow the example of Solon who gave the
Athenians not the best gov't he could devise but the best they
would receive." He declared that the people would not allow con-
gress to have this power. One reference was found in which foreign
practice was cited as an example for election of judges. On this
7
same day Franklin showed what the Scotch practice had been in thi6
respect. In that country nomination proceeded from lawyers "who
always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid
of him and share his practice among themselves ." Franklin did
not want this to be the practice in the United States."8 ^hen the
5. Far rand, "Records") * ill, i.65."
6. ibid, I, 125.
7. June 5.
8. Farrand, "Records', I, 120.
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length of term for the juiges was discussed, there was some refer-
ence to English government. English judges serve during good be-
havior. On August 37 Dickinson stated that he wanted the judges
to serve during good behavior "provided that they may be removed by
the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of
Representatives. Morris saw in this a contradiction but Sherman
in answer to him showed that this was like the situation in Great
Britain. Wilson thought that the provision in England would be less
dangerous because the House of Lords and House of commons would not
be likely to concur at the same time. He felt that the two houses
in the American legislature would concur at the same t ice ani cause
9
the judiciary to be weakened. A few references were found on the
jurisdiction of the courts, A member of the Massachusetts conven-
tion declared, "On the whole we shall find Congress possessed
of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less in-
auspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain/ wi:ich has long been
the disgrace of Christendom- I mean that diabolical institution:
10
the Inquisition." There was some objection to giving the supreme
court appellate jurisdiction. In the Pennsylvania convention Judge
Blackstone was quoted in support of such jurisdiction.
When treason was first discussed it was provided that that
crime should consist "only in levying war against them, or in adher-
ing to their enemies." Some members of the convention did not think
this extensive enough and referred to the English practice on this
subject. Randolph Yioed the sentiment of other members when he de-
clared that the clause defining treason was defective in adopting
9. Farrand, "Records" II, 425-439.
10. Elliot, "Debates", II, 111.
11. ibid, 513.
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the words, '"in adhering only.' The British Stat adds: 'giving them
13
aid and oomfort 1 wnich had a more extensive meaning." It seems,
then, that the English definition was incorporated into our con-
stitution almost intact.
One objection was found to the provision in the constitution
that the writ of Habeas Corpus "shall not be suspended, unlesb when
in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."
Henry in the Virginia convention stated, "We have infinitely more
reason to dread general warrants here than they have in England, be-
cause there, if a person be confined liberty may be quickly obtained
by the writ of habeas corpus. But here a man living many hundred
13
miles from the judges may get in prison before ho can get that writ.'"
This was part of his reason for demanding a bill of rights.
One reference was also found in regard to ex post facto laws.
The constitution provides merely that no such law shall be passed.
On August 30 Dickinson "mentioned to the House that on examining
Blaekstone's Commentaries he found that the terms 1 ex post facto 1
related to criminal cases only, that they would not consequently
restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases and that
some further provision for purpose would be requisite."^-4
13. Farrand, "Records", II, 345. One member of the Mass. conven-
tion thought that congress did not have enough power in the
punishment of treason. He compared the power of congress
with the extensive ones of the English parliament in this
regard. Elliot, "Debates," II, 100.
13. Elliot, "Debates," III, 588.
14. Farrand, "Records", II, 448.
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In its original form the constitution did not provide for a
bill of rights and the lack of this was one of the strongest ob-
jections urged against the constitution when it was before the
state conventions for ratification. A member of the Massachusetts
convention in urging a bill of rights said* "England has been quoted
for their fidelity; but did their constitution ever give such a
power as is contained In the Constitution? Did they ever allow
Parliament to vote an army for two years- to tax us without limita-
tion; no one to gainsay then, and no inquiry yearly as in Britain;
therefore if this constitution is got down, we shall alter the
system entirely, and have no checks upon congress. "15 Henry in
arguing for the bill of rights declared, "I repeat, that all nations
have adopted this construction - that all rights not expressly and
unequivocally reserved to the people are impliedly and incidentally
relinquished to rulers, as necessarily inseparable from the delegated
powers," Hs showed that this was the case in England, Spain, and
16
Germany. The provision most demanded was for trial by jury.
Maryland in proposing an amendment to the provisions for trial and
justice said, "The great objects of these amendments were 1st to
secure the trial by jury in all cases, the boasted birthright of
17
Englishmen & their descendants," Iredell perhaps best sums up
the demand for specific recognition of jury trial in a speech which
he made in the convention of North Carolina. He said, "In Great
Britain, the people speak of the trial by jury with admiration. No
ii! Eliioti ' "Debates," "' II , 'hi \
15. ibid, III, 445.
17. ibid, II, 550. Randolph argued against jury trial in civil
cases saying that there was no mention of a jury in civil cases
in the English bill of rights or the magna carta. Elliott,
"Debates," III, 573.
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monarch, or minister, however arbitrary in his principles, would
dare to attack that noble palladium of liberty. The enthusiasm of
the people in its favor would, in such a case produce general re-
sistance. That trial remains unimpaired there, although they have
a considerable standing army, and their Parliament has authority
to abolish it, If they please. But wo to those who should attempt
it.' If it be secure in that country, under those circumstances,
can we believe that congress either would or could take it away in
this? Were they to attempt it, their authority would be instantly
resisted. They Wuuid draw down on thems elves the resentment and
detestation of the people. They and their families, so long as any
remained in being, would be held in eternal infancy, and the attempt
prove as unsuccessful as it was wicked. "^
It was also proposed as an amendment by Maryland, "That the
militia shall not be subject to martial law, except in time of
war, invasion or rebellion" because this provision would "restrain
the power of Congress over the militia, although by no means so
ample as that provided by Magna Carta, and the other great funda-
mental and constitutional laws of Great Britain yet it may
prove an inestimable check, "
But there were arguments against the proposed bill of rights.
There were in the main three arguments against it . The first one
was well stated by Wilson in the Pennsylvania convention when he
declared that the bill of rights was not necessary in America as
in England where the English king had all powers not taken from it
while in America congress had only delegated powers.^ McKean in
the 3ame convention said, "Such a th ng ha3 not been deemed eseen-
18. Elliot, "Debates," IV, 140.
19. ibid, II, 552.
20. ibid, 437.
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tial to liberty, excepting in Great Britain, where there is a king
and a House of Lords* quite distinct, with respect to power and in-
terest, from che rest of the people; or in Poland, the pacta con-
ventus, which the king sings before he is crowned; and in six
States of the American United States," He also quoted Locke as an
31
authority for not having a bill of rights. Madison in the
Virginia c .nvention showed that a bill of rights was not made when
England and Scotland were united and he argued that none was
32
necessary for the United States. J> He said Scotland had had her
power a reserved instead of enumerated and he held this to be the
better plan.
VII.
Conclusion.
In conclusion it is interesting to note that there were certain
topics on which one expected reference to European practice but on
which there were none. In the first place one would expect that
since the United States was the offspring of England, there would
be some question as to whether there should be a codified consti-
tution. England did not have a oonetitution drawn up in one docu-
ment. Instead acts of parliament, court decisions, statute and
common law, treaties, and great compacts made then, as they do now,
the framework of the English government. But the colonies had had
charters; the states had framed constitutions during the revolu-
tion; and the Articles of Confederation, inadequate as they were,
21. Elliot, "Debates,, » II, 540.
23. ibid, III, 313.
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had accustomed the people to the idea of a constitution. So, on
second thought, it is not so strange that reference to the English
practice would be made in connection with the provision that con-
gressmen should be free from arrest except in certain cases and
that there should be freedom of speech in congress. These provi-
sions are very similar to the English acts providing the same things.
Yet, strangely enough, no mention was made of the English acts.^
There were also two powers given to congress which seem to be of
enough importance to warrant the mention of foreign practice. These
are the power of coining money and providing punishment for counter-
feiting and the declari ng of war. Yet no instance was found when
these questions were being discussed of any reference to foreign
practice in similar cases.
One rather interesting reference to T,he customs of foreign
countries was made in co meotion with the provision for amending
the constitution. Pinckney in some observations on the constitution
to the South Carolina legislature said that a large number of
states were necessary, but he hoped that never again would a govern-
ment be established which could be altered only by the consent of
all the hazardous situation of the Netherlands.
It is easy to underestimate the value of conscious reference
to foreign practice in the making of the consitution. Too often
has our constitution been lauded as a thing marvelously new. But
one sees that European practice in this respect served as a sign
post in 1787, In some cases it pointed out what not to do. For in-
1. Compare Nos. 107,108, and 137 in Adams and St ephens, "Select Docu-
ments of English Constitution:;! History" with the first para-
graph of articxe I, section 6 of the constitution of the U.S.
Far rand, "Records,^ II , 121. Holland was at war with Spain.
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itanoe Europe showed that a confederate form of government wac weak.
Again it seemed to show at times the way to go to reach the much de-
sired goal, a firm, strong central government
.
As one looks back over this field, he is also struck with the
fact that the makers of the constitution were exceedingly conscien-
tious in their work. History, government, and the writings of
publicists were searched in many instances for light when it seemed
that little light was to be had. At times points were accepted al-
most as they were in Europe; sometimes they were rejected entirely;
or again were ch^n^ed to reet conditions. Two lines of an old
ditty seeru zo apply to the constitution:
"Something new, something old,
Something tircid, something bold."
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